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Conceptualizing knowledge creation: a critique of 
Nonaka’s theory1 
ABSTRACT    Nonaka‟s proposition that knowledge is created through the interaction of 
tacit and explicit knowledge involving four modes of knowledge conversion is flawed. 
Three of the modes appear plausible but none are supported by evidence that cannot be 
explained more simply. The conceptual framework omits inherently tacit knowledge, 
and uses a radically subjective definition of knowledge: knowledge is in effect created 
by managers. A new framework is proposed suggesting that different kinds of 
knowledge are created by different kinds of behaviour. Following Dewey, non-
reflectional behaviour is distinguished from reflective behaviour, the former being 
associated with tacit knowledge, and the latter with explicit knowledge. Some of the 
implications for academic and managerial practice are considered. 
KEYWORDS     knowledge creation; knowledge management; knowledge types; tacit 
knowledge 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Knowledge-Creating Company (1995, pp. 6-7) Nonaka and Takeuchi claimed 
that the emphasis western companies placed on managing knowledge had not been 
accompanied by an understanding of how it is created. Nonaka
2
 proposed that 
organizational knowledge is created through the continuous social interaction of tacit 
and explicit knowledge involving four sequential modes of knowledge conversion: 
socialization, externalization, combination and internalization, before returning once 
more to socialization. This process is a „spiral‟ one, a metaphor suggesting that each 
„circuit‟ builds on the previous one; knowledge creation is also, implicitly, knowledge 
accumulation (Nonaka, 1991a; Nonaka, 1994, pp. 15, 18; Nonaka et al., 1994; Nonaka, 
1995; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 56, 61-2, 71-2, 89, 237-38; Nonaka and Toyama, 
2003; Nonaka et al., 2001a, pp. 14-18). The process was depicted by a matrix, 
sometimes called the SECI model, described as the “engine” of the entire knowledge 
creation process (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 57; see Figure 1). 
--------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------- 
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Nonaka‟s theory has achieved paradigmatic status since the mid-1990s.3 It has been 
described as one of the best known and most influential models in knowledge strategy 
literature (Choo and Bontis, 2002, p. ix) and as “highly respected” (Easterby-Smith and 
Lyles, 2003, p. 11). While other parts of the theory (Nonaka, 1994, pp. 20-35; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 70-90) have undergone considerable modification since the 
1990s (Nonaka et al., 2001a, b) the “engine” remains a central element, recently being 
described as the way firms synthesize contradictions (Nonaka and Toyama, 2003).  
The theory appears to have attracted little systematic criticism, at least not in 
management and organizational studies literature.
4
 The most far-reaching critique is in a 
neglected paper by Essers and Schreinemakers (1997). They praised Nonaka for 
recognizing that the capacity for corporate action depends on ideas and beliefs as much 
as on scientific knowledge but concluded that his subjectivism tended towards a 
dangerous relativism because he made justification a matter of managerial authority, 
and neglected to consider how scientific criteria relate to corporate knowledge. Second, 
he failed to recognize that the commitment of different groups to their ideas and the 
resulting need to resolve this conflict by managerial authority cannot bode good for 
creativity and innovation. Another comprehensive but neglected critique (Jorna, 1998) 
charged Nonaka with overlooking learning theory, earlier discussion of tacit and 
explicit knowledge, with misreading important organizational writers, and of not using 
better accounts of western philosophy. Bereiter (2002, pp. 175-179) argued Nonaka‟s 
model does not explain how new ideas are produced, nor how depth of understanding 
(necessary for expertise) develops. Further, their model of knowledge work is 
unconvincing, and they make collaborative work a mystery. These are not the only 
criticisms, but they are some of the most comprehensive and serious.
5
 
Jorna‟s critique centred on the neglect of previous research, while Essers and 
Schreinemakers, and Bereiter, were largely concerned with consequences of the model. 
In the first part of this paper the focus will be on evaluating Nonaka‟s knowledge 
creation hypothesis, the “engine” of knowledge conversion/creation, and the associated 
concepts. It will be argued that the evidence adduced in support of the modes of 
knowledge conversion is either non-existent, anecdotal, or open to alternative 
explanations. More serious are the conceptual weaknesses of the framework, in 
particular the omission of inherently tacit knowledge, and the redefinition of 
„knowledge‟ to mean managers‟ beliefs about, for example, the viability of new product 
ideas. Indeed, from this perspective, it appears Nonaka argues that knowledge is created 
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when managers decide something is knowledge for the organization. 
The second part of the paper turns to consider knowledge creation. Building on the 
consensus that there are, roughly speaking, two types of knowledge (not corresponding 
precisely to the categories tacit and explicit), it is argued that these correspond to 
Dewey‟s ([1916]) distinction between non-reflectional and reflective experiences. This 
leads to the inference that different forms of knowledge are created as a consequence of, 
and implicated in, different modes of experience/behaviour. 
KNOWLEDGE CONVERSION: THE EVIDENCE 
This section focuses on assessing the evidence cited in support of the four modes of 
knowledge creation. For this purpose Nonaka‟s central propositions about knowledge 
creation processes are taken for granted. They will be examined in the next section. 
Socialization 
Knowledge conversion, we are told, begins with the tacit acquisition of tacit knowledge 
by people who do not have it from people who do. Nonaka distinguished technical tacit 
knowledge (concrete know-how and skills) from cognitive tacit knowledge (mental 
models of the world). The socialization of the former was illustrated by a story about 
the development of a domestic bread-making machine, and of the latter with reports 
about brainstorming camps, and customer interaction (Nonaka, 1994, p. 16; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 8, 60). 
The first prototype bread-making machine failed to produce “tasty bread” and as a 
master chef could not tell the development team what they needed to know a team 
member apprenticed herself to him to learn the appropriate skills (Nonaka, 1991a, pp. 
98-9; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 63-4, 100-109). One day she “noticed the baker 
was not only stretching but also “twisting” the dough, which turned out to be the secret 
for making tasty bread” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 64). Here as elsewhere 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 105) the taste of bread is the focus, but they also 
reported that during this phase “the team had to resolve the problem of getting the 
machine to knead the bread correctly” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 105). Whether 
taste or kneading was at issue is important as it affects how we evaluate the data. 
We are asked to take as evidence of socialization the engineers‟ ability to make a 
machine capable of baking tasty bread only after their apprenticeship to the chef where 
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one team member noticed an aspect of the kneading action. Subjectivity aside, the taste 
of bread is influenced by the raw ingredients, the dough maturation process and by 
baking (Barfield, [1947], pp. 95-8), but not by kneading. The taste problem was 
probably solved incidentally during the lengthy development process when numerous 
other changes were made. Misattribution of reasons for success is to be expected 
(Nisbett and Wilson 1977), and even affects scientists who by virtue of their training 
and values might be expected to accurately report their achievements (see e.g. Collins, 
1974, 2001a). If, on the other hand, the problem lay with kneading, although the 
description lacks sufficient detail to be certain what the “twist” actually refers to, 
noticing and replicating how the chef manipulated the dough may well have been 
important. The bread machine study may thus provide evidence for the socialization of 
technical tacit knowledge, but this is far from clear. 
The stories of brainstorming camps, and customer interaction (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995, pp. 63-64; see also Nonaka, 1988a, p. 11; Nonaka and Kenney, 1991, p. 72) are 
too insubstantial to evaluate but a later study (Ichijo et al., 1998, pp. 173-203) appears 
to illustrate cognitive tacit knowledge socialization. A manager explained that 
interaction with customers was felt to be particularly important for product 
development: “ „... We come to understand what they [i.e. customers] want to do while 
talking with them about various things.‟ ” by “ „... read[ing] into their thoughts and 
desires.‟” (Ichijo et al., 1998, pp. 184-5). As another manager said, “... „we come to see 
what our customers expect towards the future while we listen, consider various 
problems and forecast upcoming changes with them‟....” (Ichijo et al., 1998, p. 181).  
It is difficult to accept these statements as evidence of anything other than the 
managers‟ beliefs about how they got ideas for new products. Had it been shown, by 
using techniques like cognitive mapping (Fletcher and Huff, 1990) for example, that 
customers tacitly held new product ideas; that they did not explicitly convey these to 
managers; but that managers‟ cognitive maps after talking with customers revealed 
evidence of new ideas similar to those of the customers, then perhaps there might be 
some justification in claiming that the socialisation of tacit cognitive knowledge can 
occur. No such evidence appears to have been produced. 
Externalization 
Socialization is followed by externalization, the conversion of tacit into explicit 
knowledge (Nonaka, 1994, p. 24; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 66), which was 
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exemplified by anecdotes about new product development. The Honda City case is the 
most detailed and tells how after several false starts new ideas began flowing under the 
stimulus of the phrase “Automobile Evolution” eventually resulting in a new design. 
The other cases appear to involve similar processes and evidence (Imai et al., 1985; 
Nonaka, 1988a, pp. 9-12; 1990, p. 35; 1991a, pp. 100-101; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995 
pp. 11-13, 69-70, 76-8, 86-7. See also Nonaka, 1988b; Nonaka and Kenney, 1991; 
Nonaka and Yamanouchi, 1989). 
In using these cases to illustrate the externalization of tacit knowledge Nonaka and his 
colleagues make two important but implicit claims. First, that the designers‟ ideas had 
been held tacitly beforehand since it was their tacit knowledge that was externalized. No 
evidence, such as might have been demonstrated through cognitive mapping, was 
produced to support this. The second implicit claim is that externalization proceeds by 
use of metaphor and analogy, a hypothesis proposed earlier by Nonaka (Nonaka, 1991b; 
see also Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 66-67). Since this hypothesis is untested, and 
we use metaphor and analogy in all our linguistic practices (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) 
either these cases do not illustrate externalization, or we are always externalizing 
whenever we speak, and so no special process needs to be invoked. 
Nonaka did not present evidence for the externalization of technical tacit knowledge but 
the bread-machine case could be interpreted in this light: it seems likely that once the 
engineers had learned how to knead bread they were able to ground the development 
and re-design of the prototype in this shared experience. Whether it makes sense to 
conceptualize this in terms of the externalization of a tacit skill is a question explored 
below. 
Combination 
The interaction of explicit knowledge with explicit knowledge or “combination” was 
described as the process of “systematizing concepts into a knowledge system” (Nonaka 
and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 67). Nonaka‟s examples include writing a report (Nonaka, 
1991a, p. 99); meetings, conversations, and exchange of documents (Nonaka, 1994, p. 
19; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 67); an MBA education (“one of the best examples” 
[Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 67]); “[m]odern computer systems” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 
19); and the „embodiment‟ of knowledge into products (Nonaka, 1991a, p. 99; Nonaka 
et al., 1996, pp. 207-8).  
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Adler (1995, p. 111) suggested Nonaka‟s claim that an MBA simply involves exchange 
of explicit knowledge might be a “playful” remark, the case study method having been 
designed to help transmit tacit knowledge. Documents have been treated as channels 
along which messages pass to the reader but this has long been criticized as an 
inadequate model (e.g. Cherry, 1966). Computer functioning and knowledge 
„embodiment‟ processes might well be viable candidates for a distinct „combination‟ 
process, but as they have not been described, we cannot be certain. Ahituv (1987), for 
example, identified the transformation of data/information from one medium to another 
as a special aspect of information systems, and this might be what Nonaka meant by 
“combination”. The lack of detail in any of these examples precludes further discussion. 
Internalization 
Internalization, the conversion of explicit into tacit knowledge, is “closely related” to 
“the traditional notion of learning”, and to “learning by doing” (Nonaka et al., 1994, pp. 
340-41; Nonaka, 1994, p. 19; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 69). Saying that 
internalization is „closely related‟ to learning implies it is distinct from learning while 
claiming that it is „triggered‟ by learning-by-doing (Nonaka et al., 1996, p. 208) 
suggests learning causes internalization.  
Nonaka and Takeuchi claimed that reading illustrates the process of cognitive tacit 
knowledge internalization as readers re-experience writers‟ experiences, thus 
transferring tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 69-70). Given that they 
also suggest that tacit knowledge arises from one‟s own experiences (Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 60-61) it is unclear how reading might generate tacit knowledge of 
what is being read about. It should only generate tacit knowledge of reading and related 
processes. The copious research into reading (e.g. Smith, 1994) appears not to provide 
any support for their claim. They also suggested that internalization is exemplified by 
the case of workers who discovered what working reduced annual hours felt like by 
working for a month at the new rate (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 70, 117-20). 
However, since the ability to do without the ability to tell is typically held to be the 
primary form of evidence for tacit knowledge, the evidential status of feelings is 
unclear. Internalization, as the acquisition of tacit knowledge from explicit knowledge, 
appears difficult to illustrate, and their examples are not convincing. 
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The evidence reconsidered 
We therefore only appear to have reasonably good evidence for the socialization and 
externalization of technical tacit knowledge, provided by the bread-making study. 
However, this evidence can be interpreted more simply than in terms of interacting 
knowledge forms. First there is no need to suggest that when someone learns under the 
guidance of an expert that some indescribable kind of knowledge is „transferred‟ by an 
unknown process. People regularly learn new skills without direct personal contact with 
an expert which testifies to the centrality of learning-by-doing for acquiring skills. An 
expert‟s role may often be to constrain novices‟ freedom of action such that they 
develop the appropriate skills (Tsoukas, 2003, p. 424; Williams et al., 1999, p. 337), or 
to provide exemplary behaviour that the novice unconsciously imitates, a process 
explicable in terms of action perception processes (see Schaal et al., 2003; 
Wohlschläger et al., 2003). 
As for externalization, Nonaka‟s emphasis on figures of speech suggests it is a linguistic 
process through which, mysteriously, tacit knowledge becomes explicit. A report of an 
apparently identical process amongst scientists (Collins, 2001a) suggests active 
exploration and experimentation rather than metaphor laden talk were the critical 
factors. Much experimentation apparently took place during prototyping of the bread 
machine (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 104-107), but the role of these activities in 
the development of the machine was not reported.  
The engineers‟ success might simply reflect a process of task design typical of modern 
organizations. Collins and Kusch‟s (1998) distinction between mimeomorphic and 
polimorphic tasks is helpful here. Mimeomorphic tasks are by definition machine-like. 
They admit of only one way of execution and their description will match the way the 
task was performed by people. Polimorphic tasks, in contrast, nearly always must be 
done in various ways, and any description is unlikely to match the kinds of input made 
by humans (Collins and Kusch, 1998). Practices such as bread-making are a mix of 
polimorphic and mimeomorphic tasks – kneading large quantities of dough by machine, 
for example, was commonplace in 1940s Britain, but the overall process still retained 
many craft elements (Barfield, [1947]).  
In competitive economies, the set of tasks of any practice are often reorganized by 
transforming polimorphic tasks into more mimeomorphic ones, otherwise known as 
deskilling (Davids and Myers, 1990; Thompson, 1983). The bread-machine designers 
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aimed to make a commercially viable machine that customers would feel made bread 
like that prepared by a chef. Their interest in the chef‟s polimorphic bread-making tasks, 
skills and associated tacit knowledge was marginally instrumental to solving an 
engineering problem that entailed designing a new bread production process. Within 
limits due to bread chemistry, for example, (and to the extent they did not modify that) 
the knowledge required to produce bread in the machine was quite different from that of 
the craft baker. Bereiter (2002, p. 177) pointed out that observation and attempted 
mimicry of birds did not enable us to fly; that required transformation of the problem. 
By analogy, the bread-machine designers did not „externalize‟ the chef‟s bread-making 
knowledge into their machine; they transformed the problem into one that could be 
handled by a particular kind of machine. It is therefore not necessary to postulate tacit-
to-tacit and tacit-to-explicit knowledge transformations when we can more simply refer 
to learning by doing on the one hand, and to designing new tasks on the other. 
Nonaka and his colleagues‟ attempt to provide a straightforward useable theory of 
knowledge creation was an ambitious one, and we should not be too surprised at 
difficulties like these. They are perhaps partly due to the derivation of the model from 
studies of information creation and innovation (Imai et al., 1985; Nonaka, 1988a; 
1988b; 1990; 1991a; Nonaka and Kenney, 1991; Nonaka and Yamanouchi, 1989) rather 
than from empirical studies of organizational knowledge processes. Reinterpretation of 
old data is of course a valid method, but it might well also constrain new theory 
development. Nonaka called for more research to validate the modes, and the „spiral‟ 
sequence (Nonaka et al., 1994, p. 350), work that on the whole still remains to be done. 
Research along some of the lines indicated above may well validate the ideas of 
socialization and externalization. However, there are more fundamental difficulties with 
the matrix concerning the conceptual framework.  
NONAKA’S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CRACKS IN THE "ENGINE"?  
The existence of conceptual difficulties has already been hinted at in the foregoing 
discussion, particularly of combination and internalization. Both these processes are 
described as comprising a number of otherwise distinct activities, two of which 
(reading, and writing) are common to both. What unites these otherwise disparate 
activities to qualify them as either (or both) combination or internalization is not made 
clear in principle, or through the examples. This unexplained empirical heterogeneity, 
together with the introduction of a new aspect, feelings, suggests a lack of conceptual 
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clarity. 
Furthermore, if tacit knowledge is the source of new knowledge (itself an 
unsubstantiated claim) it is not clear why knowledge conversion has to begin with 
socialization. New tacit knowledge is also generated by internalization, so we are told, 
and if reading and writing are both instrumental in tacit knowledge formation, then 
knowledge creation might also begin with the creative synthesis of explicit knowledge 
(“combination”). Externalization too could form a starting point since all that is required 
is that some „source‟ activity, and thus associated tacit knowledge, already exists. 
Finally, it is evident that Nonaka only proposed two modes of knowledge conversion, 
tacit to explicit, and explicit to tacit. Socialization and combination, however, are modes 
of knowledge transfer, the former concerning how one person or group acquires the 
tacit knowledge of others, and the latter the transfer of already existing explicit 
knowledge between containers (people, documents, computers).  
That these difficulties hint at the existence of deeper conceptual problems becomes 
clear when we consider key aspects of Nonaka‟s conceptual framework directly. He 
claimed that knowledge is created through the interaction of tacit and explicit 
knowledge. Three concepts, tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge, and knowledge, (and 
their interrelationships) are thus central to his theory, which will now be examined in 
more detail. 
Tacit and explicit knowledge 
Nonaka attributed the concepts of tacit and explicit knowledge to Polanyi. Tacit 
knowledge is subjective, bodily, of the here and now, and practice-based, while explicit 
knowledge is objective, of the mind, and the there and then, and concerned with theory 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 59, 61; see also Nonaka, 1994, p. 16). Tacit 
knowledge is difficult to communicate or share, but, they claimed, is a “rich untapped 
source of new knowledge” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 16; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 8, 
59-60, 72, 85; Nonaka et al., 2001a, p. 15). Nonaka distinguished technical from 
cognitive tacit knowledge to give Polanyi‟s ideas a more “practical” aspect (Nonaka, 
1994, p. 16; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 60), a puzzling move given their critique of 
dualist thought (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 25-32). 
Citing the authority of Polanyi for „tacit knowledge‟ causes difficulties since Polanyi 
used “knowledge” to mean a process, “knowing”, not an object (Gourlay, 2004). Even 
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so, his phrasing is sometimes ambiguous as when he wrote that “explicit knowledge 
must rely on being tacitly understood” (Polanyi, 1969, p. 144), a quotation that 
underlines the argument that for Polanyi there is always an irreducibly tacit aspect to 
any explicit knowledge/knowing (Adler, 1995; Gourlay, 2004; Tsoukas, 2003).  
Nonaka and his colleagues are not alone in holding that tacit knowledge can be 
converted to explicit knowledge, or, that whatever remains is trivial (e.g. Boiral, 2002, 
p. 296; Spender, 1996, p. 58; Torff, 1999, p. 195; Wagner and Sternberg, 1986). Others, 
however, claim with equal conviction that at least some tacit knowledge cannot be made 
explicit (e.g. Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001, pp. 812-3; Collins, 2001a, p. 72; Herbig 
and Büssing, 2003, p. 167; Patel et al., 1999, p. 76; Tsoukas, 2003, p. 425). Collins 
(2001b), while deliberately conceding much of the debate to those who believe tacit 
knowledge can be explicated, argued that the “forms of life” by and through which we 
conduct our social practices cannot be made explicit, and thus remain a underlying 
tacitly known component (see also Janik, 1988; Tsoukas, 2003; Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou, 2001). A model of knowledge creation processes that begins with tacit 
knowledge must therefore account in some way for both inherently and contingently 
tacit knowledge, an issue that needs addressing if Nonaka‟s hypothesis about 
knowledge creation is to be defended.  
Explicit knowledge, and knowledge 
Nonaka and his colleagues‟ distinction between explicit knowledge, and knowledge, 
raises further conceptual difficulties. They say that explicit knowledge is another name 
for declarative knowledge (Nonaka, 1994, p. 18; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 61) but 
declarative, explicit and propositional are simply names used by different disciplines for 
the same conceptual object (Sahdra and Thagard, 2003, pp. 478-9). Moreover, 
“propositional knowledge”, as used by epistemologists, means knowledge as “true, 
warranted belief” (Klein, 1998).6 We might therefore conclude Nonaka proposed that 
new (explicit) knowledge is created by the interaction of tacit knowledge and previously 
created (explicit) knowledge but Nonaka and his colleagues would not agree. 
Their claim to have adopted the definition of knowledge as „justified true belief‟ 
(Nonaka, 1994, p. 15; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 58) is misleading. Nonaka did say 
he had modified this definition considerably but he did not draw out the full 
implications of his modifications. He claimed that “for present purposes it is important 
to consider knowledge as a personal “belief,” and to emphasize the importance of the 
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“justification” of knowledge” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 15), a “critical” distinction because 
“traditional epistemology emphasizes the absolute, static, and nonhuman nature of 
knowledge” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 58; Nonaka et al., 2001a, pp. 14-15).7 
Regardless of the merits of this view it is not clear why this should be a problem except 
that if we assume knowledge is absolute and static the question of managing its creation 
can hardly be posed. 
The consequences of Nonaka and his colleagues‟ cavalier dismissal of “traditional 
epistemology” become clear in the light of their discussion of justification,8 “the process 
of determining if the newly created concepts are truly worthwhile for the organization” 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 86; Nonaka, 1994, p. 26). This clearly, and solely, 
involves the evaluation by managers of new ideas against pre-defined criteria (Nonaka, 
1994, p. 26; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 86, 103, 108-9). Thus the first prototype 
bread-making machine failed to be “justified against the original product concept” 
because it did not make tasty bread. Even when this problem had been rectified the idea 
remained unjustified because it failed to meet cost criteria (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, 
pp. 103-8). Moreover, since these criteria were “standards for judging truthfulness” 
(Nonaka, 1994, p. 26) Nonaka appears to say that if beliefs are justified in this sense, 
then they are also true. In so far as justification can be based on false premises (Klein, 
1998, p. 268) a „justified belief‟ may well be wrong. The practical implications of this 
move, however, are straightforward: „knowledge‟ as „justified belief‟ in Nonaka‟s 
framework simply means ideas and plans that have been sanctioned by managers. 
Knowledge and explicit knowledge are therefore quite different concepts for Nonaka. 
In this light it is clear that for Nonaka and his colleagues „knowledge‟ means that 
fraction of warranted beliefs about processes and their associated facts that passes 
through the filter of managerial evaluation of what is and is not practicable for the 
organization. Such processes have been widely discussed in decision-making research 
(Bazerman, 1998) and it appears the matrix concerns decision making rather than 
knowledge creation. Nonaka‟s emphasis on the importance of personal commitment to 
knowledge processes (Nonaka, 1994, p. 17-18; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 58-9) 
also makes sense in this context. No amount of personal commitment to a belief that the 
taste of bread is influenced by a “twist” can change the chemistry of baking, nor would 
it suffice when it comes to improving the design. On the other hand, personal 
commitment to a belief that a particular design will be commercially viable, and does 
meet previously specified criteria, is probably vital to success in battles over 
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organizational priorities.  
There can be no objection to distinguishing managers‟ reasoned beliefs about the 
viability of new product or process ideas from evidence about, for example, how bread-
making might be mechanized on a domestic scale. Calling both „knowledge‟, and in 
particular discussing the former in the language of epistemology risks confounding the 
distinction, however, and thus confusing discussion about the creation and management 
of knowledge in organizations. Beliefs are of course important, and a theory of 
knowledge management might even encompass them, but a realistic model of 
knowledge creation must also account for the production of scientific type knowledge 
which is after all the foundation of our ability to control material and other processes. 
Nonaka and his colleagues‟ conceptual framework omits inherently tacit knowledge, 
and adopts a radically subjective definition of knowledge (Essers and Schreinemakers, 
1997) focusing on the content of managers‟ decisions, and entirely omitting more 
scientific forms. These shortcomings are so fundamental that there is little point in 
considering their claim that knowledge is created through the social interaction of tacit 
and explicit knowledge. Indeed, their model clearly indicates that knowledge as they 
define it is primarily created by managerial decision. In so far as the matrix continues to 
figure in Nonaka and his colleagues‟ later model (e.g. Nonaka and Toyama, 2003) that 
too may be in need of revision, an issue beyond the scope of this paper. Instead we will 
focus on the important question of how we might conceptualize knowledge creation 
better, and whether or not it might be managed.  
KNOWLEDGE CREATION – TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK 
Nonaka‟s suggestion to take knowledge creation seriously (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995) is a good one since if we understand how something is made we are in a better 
position to manage it than by dealing only with the symptoms of some underlying 
process. The remainder of this paper will attempt to address some of the issues this task 
involves, beginning with a brief review of what we might mean by „knowledge‟. It will 
be argued that the widespread distinction between two kinds of knowledge (roughly, 
tacit and explicit) reflects a distinction between two broad kinds of behaviour, one of 
which appears difficult but perhaps not impossible to manage, the other being perhaps 
better understood. 
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Knowledge: a “tricky” concept 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2001, pp. 997-1012) argued that use of “knowledge” in 
management literature suffers from five problems: ontological incoherence; vagueness; 
breadth, and hence conceptual emptiness; tensions between regarding it as objective, 
and evidence of its subjectivity; and functionalism. They concluded that knowledge is a 
loose, ambiguous, and rich concept that precludes reduction to simple sets of 
distinctions (see also Blackler, 2002, p. 54; Wilson, 2002), implicitly endorsing the 
conclusion reached half a century earlier that knowledge is one of those ““vague words” 
one is at times compelled to use”, “a “loose name” ” that has been used to refer to a 
great many often different things (Dewey and Bentley, 1949, p. 48, 78).  
The situation has not improved since the 1940s. While Bentley noted that at least 
knowledge was connected with “living organisms” (Ratner and Altman, 1964, p. 459) 
more recently it is said to be embedded/embodied in “technology” (Argote and Darr, 
2000, p. 53), in documents, repositories, organizational routines, practices and norms, 
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998, quoted in Alvesson and Kärreman, 2001, 998-9), and in 
the “physical structure of the workplace” (Argote and Ingram, 2000, p. 152). 
Knowledge is indeed a “tricky” concept (Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001, p. 975)! We 
can, nevertheless, examine some ways in which the concept has been used to see 
whether these help us to conceptualize „knowledge creation‟. 
Discussion of knowledge traditionally begins with philosophy but as knowledge 
management implies an alternative paradigmatic conception (Essers and 
Schreinemakers, 1997) it is probably better to begin elsewhere. Indeed, as Nonaka and 
Takeuchi apparently implied, the „traditional‟ western view effectively prohibited 
questions about knowledge creation since knowledge was assumed to exist either in the 
environment, or in the organism (see e.g. Richardson, 1998). We will begin by 
reviewing discussion linking knowledge with information, since this has traditionally 
informed knowledge management, before proceeding to consider the implications of 
several knowledge typologies. 
Knowledge is transformed information? 
This theme is evident in various formulations about knowledge. Nonaka and his 
colleagues described knowledge as “a meaningful set of information” (Nonaka et al., 
1996, p. 205; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 58-9); Myers (1996, p. 2) called 
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organizational knowledge “processed information”, and Davenport et al., (1998, p. 43) 
described knowledge as “information combined with experience, context, interpretation 
and reflection.... a high-value form of information...”. Different versions of this “value 
chain” model (Shin et al. 2001, p. 336) exist but all place knowledge above information 
(Bouthillier and Shearer, 2002; Liang 1994; Tuomi, 1999).  
This suggests that knowledge is created through the transformation of information but 
no account is given of how information is „constituted‟, „processed‟, or „combined‟ to 
yield knowledge or how it acquires „high value‟. Such processes imply the activity of a 
cognitive system (Garavelli et al., 2002, p. 271), but this is usually treated as some kind 
of inert machinery, a view perhaps in keeping with the widespread assumption that 
information is value-free (Day, 2000). Another difficulty is that regardless of whether 
information is value-laden or value-free, the word is used in a variety of ways, 
depending on the level of analysis (Stamper, 1996). Finally, Tuomi (1999) has 
convincingly argued that knowledge is needed to specify data: the hierarchy can be 
inverted and still make sense! Treatments of knowledge in terms of information are thus 
fraught with conceptual difficulties. The fact that „information‟ and „knowledge‟ are 
often used interchangeably (Bouthillier and Shearer, 2002; Shin et al. 2001, p. 336) and 
that there is little to distinguish knowledge management from information management 
(Wilson, 2002), provides further evidence of confusion, and suggests this approach 
currently offers little support to hypotheses about knowledge creation. 
Knowledge and knowledge types 
The idea that there are roughly two distinct kinds of knowledge is widely accepted. In 
knowledge management, the labels tacit and explicit are chiefly used, but other 
disciplines use different names (Table I). Here, Sahdra and Thagard‟s (2003, p. 479) 
labels have been used. 
--------------- 
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
--------------- 
“Knowledge-how” covers knowledge that is situated or context dependent in so far as it 
does not appear meaningful to consider it as „knowledge‟ apart from someone who 
knows and the situation in which they act. Other terms include process (Shin et al. 2001, 
p. 339), or processual knowledge (Kakihara and Sørensen, 2002, pp. 51-4). Included 
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here are Gherardi and Nicolini‟s (2000, pp. 330-33) “social-material constructionist 
approach”; connectionist and autopoietic perspectives (Smith and Samuelson, 2003; von 
Krogh et al. 1996; Venzin et al. 1998); and, since practices are social processes, the 
„forms of life‟ approach (Collins, 2001b; Tsoukas, 2003; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 
2001). Cook and Brown‟s action oriented “epistemology of practice” (1999, p. 382), 
Blackler‟s emphasis on “knowing” linked with situated practices as distinct from 
“knowledge” (2002, p. 51, 54-56), and situated cognition (Clancey, 1997a) can also be 
placed here.  
Knowledge-how perspectives are diverse, covering knowledge as interpretation, 
knowledge as process, and knowledge as relationship (Kakihara and Sørensen, 2002, 
pp. 51-54) and while this heterogeneity would elsewhere warrant emphasising 
distinctions, from the perspective of knowledge creation their context dependency 
unites them. These perspectives are also largely anti-representationistic viewing 
knowledge as not representable (or, not meaningfully representable) in symbolic form. 
Knowledge-how is not simply another name for tacit knowledge since it also covers in 
particular that explicit knowledge where context is critical to give it meaning, and 
where there is contextual variability in meanings attributed to the „same‟ explicit 
knowledge.  
The knowledge-that category covers knowledge in symbolic forms existing 
independently of individual knowers; it could be labelled „decontextualized knowledge‟ 
and is all explicit in form. Kakihara and Sørensen (2002) called it the knowledge as 
object approach, and it has clear affinities with the “traditional” approach to knowledge 
(Blackler, 2002, pp. 48-54). An important feature, neatly captured in Cook and Brown‟s 
phrase the “epistemology of possession” (1999, p. 382), is that knowledge-that is held 
to be „in‟ something, an approach consistent with the “representationistic” (Kakihara 
and Sørensen, 2002, p. 50) assumption that organisms have internal states carrying 
representations of salient parts of their environment (Bechtel, 1998; see also Clancey, 
1997b, pp. 250-53). This assumption is widespread in knowledge management 
discourse where knowledge is said to be “embedded” in “repositories” (individuals, 
roles and structures, organizational practices, culture, and the physical structure of the 
workplace) or “reservoirs” (organization members, tools, and tasks, and combinations 
of these three elements) (Argote and Ingram 2000, pp. 152-153) or “materialized” into 
“knowledge object[s]”, such as documents (Garavelli, et al. 2002, p. 270).9 
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The everyday life-world and reflective experience 
So far we have considered knowledge, and a typology of knowledge types. To link this 
to knowledge creation, implicitly some kind of act, we have to shift the focus to what 
metaphorically lies behind or under these types. To do so we draw on an important 
distinction made by Dewey and later by Schutz.  
Dewey proposed to distinguish between non-reflectional experiences, characteristic of 
our everyday living, and reflective experiences, typical of the professional behaviour of 
philosophers, or scientists (Dewey, [1916]). Dewey‟s non-reflectional experience has 
clear parallels with Schutz‟ notion of the everyday life-world wherein we act 
unreflectively (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974, p. 3). Thus knowledge-how, or knowing 
(to stress its processual aspect), is characteristic of the everyday life-world. Knowledge-
that, on the other hand, “knowledge of and about things, knowledge that things are thus 
and so” is created by processes of “reflection and conscious appreciation” (Dewey, 
1930, p. 178; see also [1916], pp. 4, 12-13, 17-21), a specific kind of experiencing and 
activity. Words like “reflection” and “theorizing” might be held to imply primarily 
linguistic processes akin to Nonaka‟s externalization but the intention here, drawing on 
Dewey ([1916], pp. 13-14), is that reflection covers the whole action-reflection-action 
cycle and not just its cerebral aspect. Thus while the immediate product of reflective 
activity may be communicable mappings (Holzner, 1972, p. 9) of those events that were 
the focus of reflection, such products are also typically an intermediate step in a process 
of seeking greater control over what has been reflected on. 
The tacit knowledge fraction of know-how appears to be created in at least three ways. 
First it may be innate or due to instinct. Dewey noted that knowing how was an 
“outgrowth of unlearned activities which are part of man‟s endowment at birth” 
(Dewey, 1930, p. 89) and Torff (1999, p. 195) regarded innate predispositions as a 
particularly recalcitrant form of tacit knowledge. The idea of innate knowledge need not 
imply nativism or biological determinism since what appears as innate depends on 
particular organism-environment developmental conditions for its formation (Gottlieb, 
2001).Tacit knowledge can also be acquired without awareness through implicit 
learning (e.g. Berry and Dienes, 1993). Finally, important aspects of expertise are 
exercised tacitly but were learned explicitly, and if experts‟ normal decision-making is 
disrupted they can „recall‟ the relevant explicit knowledge (Ambrosini and Bowman, 
2001; Patel et al., 1999). 
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It is often held, largely following Polanyi, that tacit knowledge is „personal‟ and 
therefore implicitly private. While we are each clearly in some respects unique, 
implying individually specific knowledge underpins our behaviour, in so far as we 
engage in practices, thus “acting in ways similar to others, with a view to achieving 
states of affairs which others also attempt to achieve, and using the same type of 
resource... to achieve that type of end.” (Harris, 1980, p. 29, quoted in Reed, 1985, p. 
119) then „individual‟ tacit knowledge is simultaneously „collective‟ at least to the 
extent of being shared “forms of life” (Collins, 2001b; Tsoukas, 2003). 
Neuropsychological and anthropological models (Frith and Wolpert, 2003; Strauss and 
Quinn, 1997) help us understand how such „sharing‟ is possible without conscious 
awareness or intent on the actors‟ part, and without invoking mysterious tacit knowing 
processes.  
The explicit fraction of know-how is simply that of our everyday life-world language; 
our readily articulable commonsense beliefs that are at hand in any situation. These can 
often be elaborated – we can answer questions as to why we do something, but typically 
in the everyday life-world there is a limit beyond which we cannot go without slipping 
over into reflective activity. This appears to be what reference to our „forms of life‟ 
(Collins, 2001b) means. As we move from the everyday life-world into that of reflective 
activity these cognitive limits, while remaining at some level, can be selectively pushed 
back. An astronomer, like the rest of us, knows that the sun rises every day, but in her 
professional life, knows this is an illusion yet accepts (and may even be unaware) that 
her calculations relating to astronomical phenomena rests on yet other unexamined 
assumptions. 
Moving further, so to speak, into the reflective world(s) we find that a defining 
characteristic of, for example, scientific work is that the methods whereby knowledge is 
created are themselves explicit and open to question. While scientists cannot escape the 
psychological and sociological constraints of human decision making on the knowledge 
they produce (Bechtel and Richardson, 1998; Collins, 1974, 2001a, b) their methods can 
be described, reflected upon and improved, and, within the kinds of local limits 
described by research into scientific practices (Collins, 1974, 2001a) replicated by 
others. Such knowledge, whatever its limits, is thus often more reliable, as well as more 
likely to be systematically corrected, than that of the everyday life-world. 
From this perspective it is clear that knowledge is not created by some relation (or 
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“interaction”) between two kinds of knowledge but through human activities or 
practices in general, on the one hand, and through a specific sub-set of practices 
(“theorizing is one practice amongst others” [Ryle, 1963, p. 27]) on the other. There is 
thus no opposition between the two, nor any need to assimilate one to the other; explicit 
knowledge is not „externalized‟ tacit knowledge, but representations of abstractions 
from ongoing practices that appear salient to their understanding and the exercise of 
control over them, as well as useful for communicating with others.  
Managing knowledge creation 
It would appear that much know-how, especially aspects of tacit knowledge, may be 
beyond overt control, and thus management in an active sense. Instinct, as well as 
experiences that shaped someone‟s tacit knowledge before they enter into a specific 
employment relationship, are beyond the capacity of managers to influence directly. Of 
course, some experiences such as formal schooling, for example, partly function to 
inculcate work relevant tacit knowledge, and managers‟ actions can influence its 
reproduction in the workplace. In so far as tacit knowledge is created and maintained by 
ongoing experiences, managing cannot avoid influencing it as a consequence of implicit 
(Berry and Dienes, 1993) or incidental and informal (Garrick, 1998) learning processes. 
Decisions taken for one good (managerial) reason may have negative consequences for 
tacit knowledge. As Lado and Wilson (1994, p. 175) noted, Taylorised work practices 
can “inhibit the development of transformational competencies by promoting and 
reinforcing organisational „defensive routines‟”. Perhaps exercising “care” (von Krogh, 
1998) may help to avoid such consequences, but as Popper and Lipshitz‟s (1998) review 
of psychological and sociological processes affecting learning at work shows, these are 
undoubtedly very complex. The issue of consciously influencing others‟ unconscious 
behaviours also raises important ethical questions. In so far as expertise develops 
through repeated exposure to similar problems, given prior explicit training, this type of 
tacit knowledge may be the easiest to manage. Accepting that tacit knowledge is created 
all the time, being shaped by people‟s experiences, should at least encourage the 
recognition that decisions taken for ostensibly good explicit reasons may have 
unintended and undesirable consequences that we should seek to inquire into before 
committing ourselves to decisions.  
Managing explicit knowledge – both that which is part of knowledge-how and more 
particularly that which comprises knowledge-that – requires us to consider on the one 
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hand to what extent common-sense processes of thinking and acting can be managed, 
and on the other, whether more systematic (scientific-type) methods can be used in 
organizations, and if so, how they can be managed effectively. The idea of questioning 
and thus to a degree managing common-sense processes is not a new one, having been 
addressed in terms of developing awareness of theory-in-use, and of seeking to modify 
it. It is, however, extremely difficult, and there is debate as to how far it is possible, or 
desirable, and whether or not it is compatible with other managerial objectives (Argyris 
and Schön, 1974; Friedman et al., 2001; Gray, 1996). This issue has obvious affinities 
with considering the potential unintended consequences of decisions referred to above. 
In so far as organizations conduct more formal scientific-type research, this kind of 
knowledge creation process has been managed for some time. Whether it is managed as 
effectively as it could be is another issue, and doubtless this area could benefit from 
drawing on, for example, studies of scientific and technical practices (Barley and Orr, 
1997; Collins 1974, 2001a).  
As regards consciously influencing (and thus managing) both commonsense and 
scientific knowledge creation processes, it is interesting to note that the presence of 
informed outsiders appears useful if not critical. Indeed, if one of the defining features 
of the forms of life constraint on explicit knowledge is that the participants in a practice 
typically are unaware of the presuppositions on which those practices depend, then the 
presence of outsiders is likely to be critical to making such assumptions explicit. The 
breakthrough in the bread-machine design was attributed to a software engineer who 
was not part of the engineering team as such (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 104). In 
Collins‟ study of sapphire quality measurement (2001a), it took the collaborative efforts 
of Russian and British scientists several days to identify the precise importance of 
specific aspects of the Russians‟ practices. The software engineer, and the British 
scientists, were both informed participants (they understood important aspects of the 
processes) but were outsiders, not being full members of the practices central to the 
problem at hand in each case. The role of psychologists in drawing up a tool to help 
managers become aware of the tacit assumptions on which they base important 
decisions (Wagner and Sternberg, 1986) as of outsiders for raising awareness of 
theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön, 1974) also testifies to the critical role of informed 
outsiders.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
Nonaka‟s proposition that knowledge is created through the interaction of tacit and 
explicit knowledge via four knowledge conversion processes has been found wanting on 
empirical and conceptual grounds. The bread-machine study provides the only evidence 
that warrants serious attention, and could be interpreted as showing evidence for both 
socialization, and externalization. However, the evidence is also open to alternative 
explanations that do not require us to explain the events in terms of interaction between 
forms of knowledge. Combination, and internalization, in particular, appear to be 
ambiguous notions, while knowledge conversion has been conflated with knowledge 
transfer in the matrix.  
The underlying theory rests on a unidimensional view of tacit knowledge, ignoring 
views that tacit knowledge may be at least partially if not wholly inherently tacit. The 
distinction between explicit knowledge and knowledge seems unclear, until on 
examination it is evident that Nonaka and his colleagues have re-defined knowledge to 
mean „justified belief‟. This is more than simply a contraction of the traditional 
(western) epistemological definition of knowledge, since it refers specifically to 
managers‟ beliefs, justified with respect to prior strategic decisions, and to forecasts. 
„Knowledge‟ concerning for example certainties about how to control things to effect 
desired goals (such as making tasty bread) remains unaccounted for in this model. It is 
therefore less a model or theory of knowledge creation through knowledge conversion, 
than one concerning managerial decision-making. 
In so far as „knowledge‟ is an important factor in contemporary societies and 
organizations, and on the assumption that it is created in some sense, then clearly it is 
worth developing an understanding of such processes. It is notoriously difficult to 
define „knowledge‟ satisfactorily, but, building on the widespread distinction between 
two forms or types of knowledge, a broad approach was outlined. It should be noted that 
the two forms emphasised in this paper, labelled know-how and know-that, do not 
correspond simply to tacit and explicit knowledge since the former includes knowledge 
of which the knowers can and do tell and are consciously aware of. The utility of this 
distinction lies in that, building on ideas from Dewey and Schutz, we can propose that 
corresponding to these two apparent forms of knowledge are two modes of behaviour. 
On the one hand we have the everyday life-world (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973), the 
world of non-reflectional experience (Dewey, [1916]) wherein we act in a non-
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reflectional manner; we simply get on with living, acting both consciously and 
unconsciously with respect to the objects of our conscious (and unconscious) attention. 
We typically do not think about how we are acting. On the other hand we have the 
world of reflective experience (Dewey, [1916]), phases of activity characterized by the 
conscious intent and attempt to analyse and describe some other experience or observed 
events with a view to communicating something to others, and perhaps for controlling 
those events. The work of scientists, loosely put, is a prime example of the latter type of 
behaviour. 
The proposition then is that it seems useful to regard the two forms of knowledge as 
consequences (and also, to a degree, components) of two general modes of behaviour. 
Knowledge, on this account, is, and can perhaps only be, managed indirectly, through 
managing behaviour. In so far as know-how is a consequence/component of everyday 
behaving, any steps to influence the latter will affect know-how. Such techniques 
already exist and are used in, for example, sports coaching (Williams et al., 1999) and 
perhaps underpins some language teaching methods. Whether or not it is possible, let 
alone desirable, that we should consciously be able to structure someone‟s 
organizational everyday life-world such that they „acquire‟ certain know-how is a 
matter for further debate and research. On the other hand we appear to know far more 
about how to guide and manage more explicitly reflectional processes. The whole field 
of research methodologies, for example, is concerned with how to conduct our 
behaviour vis-a-vis certain kinds of research objects, usually, but not always, with a 
view to obtaining inter-subjective agreement amongst researchers about those objects. 
Studies of scientific and other reflectional work are also to hand. 
The broad implications for practice, both managerial and academic, of this hypothesis 
are clear. They are that know-how is influenced by all the actions we undertake. 
Whether it can be managed, in the sense that we ourselves, or someone else, can overtly 
influence know-how, is more difficult to determine. Good managers will be well aware 
that changing one aspect or condition of work often has adverse consequences for other 
aspects of behaviour. In so far as these are well-known and documented, they should 
perhaps be taken more seriously into account as having potentially adverse 
consequences for otherwise valuable know-how. Academics might take up the synthesis 
of what we already know about unplanned consequences of managerial actions, and 
formulate a research programme to develop this area. While non-reflectional behaviour 
goes on in every organization, of necessity, reflectional activities may not. Scientific 
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work is often divorced from areas of its application, and is thus managed independently. 
But in so far as employees in any organization may, and may need, to reflect on what 
they are actually doing, they may derive assistance from formal research methodologies 
instead of relying on intuition. Academic research could also perhaps fruitfully consider 
to what extent and how reflective activity can become part and parcel of typical 
managerial work. 
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Figure 1: The “engine” of knowledge creation  
(adapted from Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 62, 71) 
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Table I: Knowledge types and names 
Discipline Knowledge-how Knowledge-that  
philosophy
1 
Knowledge-how; procedural 
knowledge; abilities 
Knowledge-that; propositional 
knowledge 
philosophy (Polanyi)
2 
Tacit knowing Explicit knowledge 
psychology
1 
Implicit knowledge; tacit 
abilities; skills 
Explicit knowledge; 
declarative knowledge 
artificial intelligence
1 
Procedural knowledge Declarative knowledge 
neuroscience
3 
Covert knowledge Overt knowledge 
management studies
4
; 
education
5 
Tacit knowledge Explicit knowledge 
IT studies
6
  Knowledge as process Knowledge as object 
knowledge 
management
7 
Know-how Know-what 
sociology of science
8 
Tacit; encultured (forms of 
life) 
Explicit/symbolic 
Sources: (1) Sahdra and Thagard, 2003, p. 479; (2) Gourlay, 2004; (3) Weiskrantz, 
1997, p. 256; (4) Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; (5) Alexander et al. 1991; (6) Kakihara 
and Sørensen, (2002); (7) Whitehill 1997; (8) Collins, 1993, 2001b. 
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NOTES     
1
 I would like to thank the editors, Professor Harry Collins, Andy Nurse, and three 
anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
Versions of it have been aired at Warwick University, Kingston University, and 
Copenhagen Business School – I am grateful to students and staff at those 
institutions for their comments. Errors of omission or commission remain my 
responsibility. 
2
  The theory appears originally to have been developed by Nonaka (e.g. Nonaka, 
1991a, b; 1994) and subsequently presented in several collaborative publications 
(e.g. Nonaka et al., 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Here „Nonaka‟ and „Nonaka 
and his colleagues‟ will be used interchangeably except where it is necessary to be 
more precise. 
3
  Nonaka (1994) was cited 543 times, and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 1093 times 
between 1994, and June 2004. The number of citations has increased year on year, as 
has the range of categories of journals in which this publication has been cited 
(source: ISI Citation Indexes searched June 2004). Of course citations are made for 
many reasons, but this level of interest indicates these are considered very important 
works. 
4
  The volume of citations of their work (see Note 3) makes it difficult to be certain 
that all significant criticisms of their model have been identified. For this paper, 
abstracts of citations of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) were searched extensively for 
terms indicative of criticism or significant amendment: only six were found. Further 
criticism may have been published in edited volumes which are typically not 
indexed. However, had systematic criticism been published it would surely have 
been cited, and its absence, and the fact that no further suggestions were made during 
the refereeing process, suggests that none has yet appeared.  
5
 For additional criticism of details see in particular Becerra-Fernandez and Sabherwal 
(2001); Poell and van der Krogt (2003); Engeström (1999, pp. 380, 388-90); Griffin 
et al. (1999); Hildreth and Kimble, (2002); McAdam and McCreedy (1999, p. 96); 
Stacey, (2001, p. 35); and Yolles (2000). 
6
 Since justification can be based on false premises, epistemologists now prefer to 
define knowledge as “true, warranted, belief” rather than „justified true belief‟ (Klein 
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1998, p. 268). 
7  They also proposed considering “knowledge as a dynamic human process of 
justifying personal belief toward the “truth.”... ” (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995, p. 58, 
their italics) but this processual notion did not inform further development of their 
theory.  
8  Nonaka and his colleagues do not discuss „belief‟ implicitly taking its meaning for 
granted, an unsound position since „belief‟ is an ambiguous word (Dewey, 1938, p. 
15). Luper (1998) indicates that the relationship between knowledge and belief is 
unclear. 
9
 Shin et al. (2001, pp. 337-339) distinguish a third category of knowledge 
perspectives, “belief in mind”. Since „beliefs in mind‟ are typically held to take the 
form of representations (Bechtel, 1998) this could be included in the 
decontextualized group, although were it to be argued that such beliefs only generate 
meaning in contexts, then it would belong to the context dependent group. Either 
way makes no difference in the present context. 
